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Agnes E. Van den Berg
Wageningen University and Research Center
The authors propose that wilderness is intrinsically associated with death, and, consequently, terror
management concerns may promote more negative evaluations of wilderness. Consistent with this,
wilderness inspired more thoughts about death than either cultivated nature or urban environments (Study
1), and death reminders reduced perceived beauty of wilderness (Study 2). The authors further suggest
that active self-regulation facilitates suppression of the dark side of wilderness. Consistent with this,
action orientation was positively related to perceived beauty of wilderness (Study 3), and after viewing
wilderness, action-oriented individuals were more efficient at suppressing the association between
wilderness and death than state-oriented individuals (Study 4). Direct death reminders overruled the
effects of action orientation on nature evaluation (Study 5), presumably because direct death reminders
are difficult to suppress even for action-oriented individuals.
In a world that is increasingly urbanized and dominated by
human artifacts, people’s contact with nature can no longer be
taken for granted. Close encounters with wilderness are still pos-
sible in remote locations, where human civilization is barely no-
ticeable. In most modern urban environments, however, people’s
interactions with wild nature are highly restricted and largely
dependent on people’s willingness to invest time and resources in
visiting the great outdoors. Remarkably, the growing distance
between people and nature has gone hand in hand with more
positive attitudes toward wilderness (Rudzitis & Johansen, 1991;
Thacker, 1983). Even so, ancient fears of nature have not vanished,
and they may reemerge when people are exposed to wilderness
(Bixler & Floyd, 1997; Öhman & Mineka, 2000). Modern indi-
viduals have thus come to feel deeply ambivalent toward wilder-
ness, finding it both beautiful and terrifying, both awesome and
awful (Burke, 1757/1999).
Wilderness may be defined as any environment where human
influences are not discernible and in which natural processes are
left free reign (see Shultis, 1999). For various reasons, it seems
important to learn more about people’s evaluations of wilderness.
Attitudes toward large-scale environmental problems like pollu-
tion, urbanization, and deforestation are closely connected with
people’s evaluations of wilderness (Hartig, Kaiser, & Bowler,
2001; Van den Berg, De Vries, & Vlek, in press). Accordingly,
improving our understanding of these evaluations may suggest
new ways to combat these pressing issues. People’s relations with
wilderness are, further, of intrinsic psychological interest. For the
greater part of evolutionary history, the human species lived in
savage, uncultivated territories (Appleton, 1975; Orians, 1980). It
is therefore plausible that the human psychological makeup has
evolved, at least in part, to cope with the risks and challenges of
wilderness environments. Studying people’s reactions to wilder-
ness may thus shed more light on the basic workings of the human
mind.
In the present research, we seek to illuminate some of the
motivational dynamics that underlie people’s evaluations of wil-
derness. Our central assumption is that wilderness is charged with
highly ambivalent meanings. The untamed forces of nature are
intrinsically connected with uncontrollability and death. At the
same time, wilderness embodies the vital forces of life and offers
freedom from cultural constraints. Because life and death, freedom
and uncontrollability represent equally valid aspects of wilderness,
psychological factors may determine how people evaluate wilder-
ness. Salient terror management concerns may sensitize people to
their fears of uncontrolled wilderness. Conversely, active self-
regulation may enable people to overcome their deeply rooted
fears and enjoy the life-enhancing qualities of wilderness. In the
following paragraphs, we consider these ideas in more detail and
present five studies that empirically tested our analysis.
The Bright and Dark Sides of Wilderness
Wilderness often elicits very positive reactions in people. People
generally find wilderness much more beautiful than cultivated
nature (Hartig & Evans, 1993; Van den Berg, 2003). Moreover,
exposure to wilderness can promote both physical and psycholog-
ical well-being (Hartig, Evans, Jamner, Davis, & Gärling, 2003;
Van den Berg, Koole, & Van der Wulp, 2003). In view of these
observations, environmental scientists have argued that people
have a “biophilia” motive, a biologically based affinity for life and
life-like processes (Ulrich, 1993; Wilson, 1984). Encounters with
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wilderness may further satisfy important psychological needs.
Wilderness provides opportunities for mastery and exploration,
because it is not preorganized or constrained by artificial bound-
aries. Moreover, encounters with wilderness allow people to re-
move themselves from the obligations and pressures that are
associated with the civilized world. Finally, the confrontation with
wilderness inspires feelings of awe, and it often leads to thoughts
about spiritual meanings and eternal processes (Kaplan & Kaplan,
1989; Williams & Harvey, 2001).
Wilderness also has a dark side. Wilderness is inherently asso-
ciated with death and uncontrollability (Becker, 1962, 1973; Bixler
& Floyd, 1997). The laws of nature dictate that all forms of life are
finite, therefore death and decay can be witnessed throughout the
natural world. In addition, the forces of nature are by definition
uncontrolled and often uncontrollable by humans. To be sure,
humanity’s control over the natural environment has increased
dramatically since the modern age. Still, the forces of nature have
never been tamed completely, a point that becomes tragically clear
during natural disasters like floods and epidemics. Even during
less dramatic events, close encounters with nature may give rise to
feelings of apprehension (Van den Berg & Ter Heijne, 2004). For
instance, modern urban youth commonly experience fear and
discomfort when they are exposed to wilderness settings during
mandatory school trips (Bixler & Floyd, 1997). In a related vein,
many participants of wilderness programs report that being alone
in the wilderness can invoke overwhelming feelings of terror and
anxiety (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989).
In sum, wilderness is charged with highly ambivalent meanings.
Life and death, freedom and chaos are equally valid aspects of
wilderness. People’s responses to wilderness are thus likely to vary
depending on which side of nature is psychologically more salient.
Koole and Van den Berg (2004) have recently argued that dynamic
motivation processes regulate people’s responses to wilderness. In
line with this argument, we consider how terror management
concerns (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991, 2004) and
self-regulation (Kuhl, 1984; Kuhl & Koole, 2004) may influence
people’s sensitivity to the ambivalent meanings of wilderness.
Terror Management and the Dark Side of Wilderness
Given the close association between wilderness and death, peo-
ple’s responses to nature might be influenced by their need to
come to grips with deeply rooted existential fears. A systematic
framework for understanding how people cope with existential
fear is provided by terror management theory (TMT). TMT offers
a comprehensive theoretical analysis of the existential concerns
that underlie human behavior, an analysis that has been supported
by over 100 experiments to date (see Solomon et al., 2004, for a
discussion of 20 years of TMT research). Of particular interest,
TMT has recently been applied to human–nature relations (Gold-
enberg, Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 2000; Koole & Van
den Berg, 2004).
According to TMT, human–nature relations have been pro-
foundly affected by the development of self-awareness in the
human species. Although self-awareness has many adaptive sides,
it also leads people to realize that their own death is ultimately
inescapable. To manage the potential for terror that comes with
this realization, TMT posits that people construct cultural world-
views that offer ways of achieving literal or symbolic immortality.
This acculturation process enlarges the separation between humans
and nature through a wide variety of cultural practices, such as
eating with utensils and avoiding public nudity, and through the
creation of cultural artifacts, like automobiles and plastic bags.
According to TMT, this cultural separation helps to control exis-
tential anxiety. By enlarging the gap between humanity and nature,
people implicitly affirm their beliefs that they are symbolic beings,
which are not subject to the natural laws of death and decay.1 In
support of TMT, research has shown that individuals who are
reminded of death are more likely to distance themselves from
their biological functions (Goldenberg & Roberts, 2004) and are
more prone to support beliefs that humans are distinct from ani-
mals and to report being disgusted by animals (Goldenberg et al.,
2001).
From a terror management perspective, nature is especially
threatening when the forces of nature do not obey cultural rules
and conventions. Terror management concerns thus form a pow-
erful motivation for cultivating wilderness. Consistent with this,
virtually all known cultures have presented their members with
idealized images of cultivated nature, such as the biblical Garden
of Eden and the Arcadian pastoral landscapes of the ancient
Greeks (Eisenberg, 1998). Such idealized images convey that the
savage forces of nature can be tamed, and they may thereby
alleviate the existential anxiety that is aroused by the confrontation
with wilderness. Accordingly, existential concerns may give rise
not only to decreased preference for wilderness but also to in-
creased preference for cultivated nature. Initial support for this
reasoning was found in a study of 460 participants from various
regions in the Netherlands (Van den Berg, 1999). In this study,
concerns with personal safety were negatively correlated with
preference for wild over cultivated natural landscapes. Though
preliminary, these findings fit with the notion that existential
concerns fuel the desire for human control over natural
environments.
Self-Regulation and Suppression of the Dark Side of
Wilderness
The need to defend oneself against existential anxiety accounts
for a wide range of motivated behaviors (Pyszczynski, Greenberg,
& Solomon, 1997). Yet people are not invariably driven by de-
fensive needs. Throughout evolutionary history, people have in-
habited environments that were highly dynamic and constantly
changing (Sedikides & Skowronski, 1997). To live and prosper in
such surroundings, people had to be at least somewhat open to new
experiences, to explore new grounds, and to develop new cognitive
and behavioral capabilities. If people were always compelled to
obey their defensive instincts, they would probably not be prepared
to take the risks that are involved in such expansive activities.
1 Our theoretical perspective distinguishes between fear of nature and
fear of chaos or uncertainty. Although nature can be chaotic and disorga-
nizing from the viewpoint of human society, many natural events are
simultaneously lawful and terrifying. For instance, the natural decay of the
body proceeds in more or less the same orderly and predictable sequence
for every human being, but the thought of this physical decay is still
anxiety provoking for most people (Goldenberg & Roberts, 2004). Thus,
although fear of chaos may sometimes contribute to fear of nature, fear of
nature cannot be reduced to fear of chaos or uncertainty.
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Self-regulation may be one important mechanism through which
people may overcome their initial defensive reactions. Self-
regulation refers to central executive functions by which people
can override their automatic behavior programs and select more
appropriate behaviors (Baumeister, Heatherton, & Tice, 1994).
People may use self-regulation to control their negative emotions
(Gross, 1999; Koole & Kuhl, in press). Accordingly, self-
regulation may enable people to overcome their deeply rooted
fears of the wilderness.
An extensive analysis of self-regulation of affective states is
provided by personality systems interactions (PSI) theory (Koole
& Kuhl, in press; Kuhl, 2000; Kuhl & Koole, 2004). According to
PSI theory, self-regulation of affect functions much like a learned
skill. Each time that people activate self-regulatory systems when
unwanted affect becomes inhibited, their ability to self-regulate
affect grows stronger. Over time and depending on individual
learning histories, people may develop more or less efficient
self-regulation skills. Kuhl (1981) has referred to individuals with
well-developed self-regulation skills as “action-oriented” individ-
uals. Individuals with less developed self-regulation skills have
been referred to as “state-oriented” individuals.
To date, more than 60 published studies have supported the
validity of the action orientation construct (for reviews, see Dief-
endorf, Hall, Lord, & Strean, 2000; Koole & Kuhl, in press; Kuhl
& Koole, 2004). As far as we can tell, no research has directly
related action orientation to nature evaluation. Nevertheless, sev-
eral findings suggest the theoretical relevance of action orientation
to human–nature relations. Relative to their state-oriented coun-
terparts, action-oriented individuals are more prone to explore
unknown environments (Kuhl, 1984), feel less disoriented in alien-
ating situations (Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994b), are better able to
perceive coherence in a threatening context (Baumann & Kuhl,
2002), and are more prone to remove themselves from social
obligations (Baumann & Kuhl, 2003; Kuhl & Kazén, 1994). Taken
together, the psychological profile of action-oriented individuals
seems highly compatible with wilderness environments. Con-
versely, the psychological profile of state-oriented individuals
seems more compatible with cultivated nature.
Both action- and state-oriented individuals are likely to be
troubled by the problem of death. However, action-oriented indi-
viduals are likely to be more proficient at avoiding a full-blown
confrontation with death concerns than are state-oriented individ-
uals. Research suggests that action-oriented individuals are
equipped with highly efficient suppression skills, which operate
largely on unconscious levels (Jostmann, Koole, Van der Wulp, &
Fockenberg, in press; Kuhl, 2001). The unconscious nature of
action-oriented suppression seems adaptive, because it allows
action-oriented individuals to remain focused on their goal pursuits
while they are dealing with unwanted states of mind. Action-
oriented individuals may thus suppress the dark side of wilderness
and, consequently, be more able than state-oriented individuals to
enjoy the bright side of wilderness.
Even so, action-oriented suppression skills are not without lim-
itations. Action-oriented suppression is most likely to succeed in
response to indirect death reminders (e.g., wilderness). This is
because indirect death reminders can be processed at a meaningful
level without fully confronting the problem of death. By contrast,
when action-oriented individuals are directly confronted with the
problem of death (e.g., through verbal death reminders), even the
most efficient suppression skills are unlikely to keep death
thoughts at bay. Consequently, direct death reminders may force
action-oriented individuals to face the problem of death and,
thereby, lead these individuals to respond defensively toward
wilderness. Notably, this defensive position is likely to be chronic
among state-oriented individuals.
The Present Research and Hypotheses
In the present studies, we sought to empirically test the forego-
ing analysis of human–nature relations. In Study 1, we investigated
the idea that people associate death and freedom more strongly
with wilderness than with cultivated nature or cities. In Study 2,
we examined the influence of death reminders on evaluations of
wild versus cultivated nature. We predicted that death reminders
would lead participants to become less favorable toward wilder-
ness and more favorable toward cultivated nature. In Study 3, we
tested the hypothesis that action orientation is positively associated
with preference for wilderness. In Study 4, we explored how action
orientation regulates the psychological association between wil-
derness and death. Finally, in Study 5, we examined the interactive
influence of subliminal death reminders and action orientation on
nature evaluation.
Our analysis treats evaluations of wilderness and evaluations of
cultivated nature as systemic variables, in that more positive eval-
uations of wilderness imply more negative evaluations of culti-
vated nature and vice versa. Our predictions are thus not so much
concerned with evaluations of each separate nature type, as with
evaluations of wilderness relative to participants’ evaluations of
cultivated nature. In statistical terms, we are concerned with vari-
ables influencing the interaction between evaluations of wilder-
ness and evaluations of cultivated nature rather than with testing
variables that influence evaluations of each type of nature sepa-
rately (see Rosnow & Rosenthal, 1995, on the rationale of this
approach; see Tesser, 1988, for an analogous systemic approach in
the domain of self-evaluation).
Study 1
In Study 1, we asked participants to report how often they were
inclined to think about various topics when they were in a wilder-
ness environment relative to when they were in cultivated nature or
in the city. In line with the dark side of nature, we predicted that
wilderness would be more strongly associated with ruminations
about death than the other environments. Notably, participants in
Study 1 lived in predominantly urban environments (like the vast
majority of people in the Netherlands). Participants were thus
likely to have encountered many more objectively life-
endangering circumstances (e.g., traffic accidents) in the city than
in the wilderness. The predicted link between wilderness and death
thoughts was thus presumably based on symbolic associations
rather than on the objective statistical association between wilder-
ness and death.
We assessed the bright side of nature by asking participants in
which environment they thought most often about freedom. We
chose to focus on freedom because this topic is clearly related to
the bright side of wilderness, whereas freedom is not necessarily
associated with death—unlike topics such as life and spirituality.
Freedom is at approximately the same level of abstraction as death,
1016 KOOLE AND VAN DEN BERG
unlike topics such as discovery or exploration, which refer to
concrete activities. Moreover, like death, freedom does not refer to
a specific emotion, as do topics such as awe or mastery. In line
with the bright side of nature, we predicted that wilderness would
be more strongly associated with ruminations about freedom than
would the other types of environments. Finally, given the speci-
ficity of our analysis, we predicted that wilderness would not be
associated with positive or negative ruminations on topics unre-
lated to freedom or death.
Method
Participants. Ninety paid volunteers at the Vrije Universiteit Amster-
dam (33 women and 57 men,2 average age 23 years) participated in the
experiment.
Procedure and equipment. On arrival in the laboratory, participants
were seated in separate cubicles, each containing an Apple Macintosh
(iMac) computer. The remaining instructions were administered via the
computer. Participants were informed that the investigation consisted of a
series of separate studies. The first studies were unrelated to the present
research and lasted about 20 min. Participants then moved on to a ques-
tionnaire on “Environments and Thoughts.” Next, all participants were
asked to provide some biographical data regarding their gender and age.
Finally, participants were probed regarding their perceptions of the exper-
iment, debriefed, and paid.
Environments and Thoughts Questionnaire. In this questionnaire,
participants were presented with eight different topics: relation prob-
lems, politics, family, money matters, death, art, studies, and freedom.
In the first part of the questionnaire, participants were asked to choose
whether they were most inclined to think about each topic in wild or
cultivated nature. Wild nature was described as nature that has been
hardly influenced by humans, such as an impenetrable forest, a
primeval swamp, or a rain forest. Cultivated nature was described as
nature that has been strongly influenced by humans, such as mead-
ows, polders (i.e., drained marshlands), or grain fields. The instruc-
tions emphasized that the questions were not about how often partici-
pants thought in general about the topics. Rather, participants were
asked to indicate how strongly they were inclined to think about
the topics once they found themselves in a particular environment.
The second part of the questionnaire dealt with the comparison be-
tween the city and wild nature. The city was described as an environ-
ment in which nature played almost no role, such as the downtown area
of a large city, highways, or industrial areas. The third and last part of
the questionnaire dealt with the comparison between cultivated nature
and the city.
Results and Discussion
The results of Study 1 are shown in Table 1. As predicted,
76.7% of the participants reported that they were more inclined to
think of death in the wilderness than in cultivated nature. Likewise,
68.9% of the participants were more inclined to think of death in
the wilderness than in the city. In both cases, the distributions
differed significantly from a 50–50 (chance) distribution ( ps 
.001). Also as predicted, wilderness was associated with thoughts
about freedom. As many as 81.1% of the participants reported that
they were more inclined to think of freedom in the wilderness than
in cultivated nature. Likewise, 77.8% of the participants were more
inclined to think of freedom in the wilderness than in the city.
Again, these distributions were significantly different from chance
( ps  .001). The double association between wilderness and
thoughts about death and freedom supports the idea that wilderness
activates ambivalent meanings.
Participants reported that they were less inclined to think about
politics, personal finances, and studies in the wilderness than in
either a cultivated natural environment or in the city ( ps  .001).
Participants reported thinking equally often about relationship
problems in each type of environment ( ps  .10). Notably, there
was a marginal trend indicating that cultivated nature was more
associated with thoughts about death than the city ( p  .073). In
addition, cultivated nature was more associated with thoughts
about freedom than the city ( p  .0001). Cultivated nature thus
appeared to be psychologically midway between wilderness and
the city. Compared with the city, cultivated nature was somewhat
more strongly associated with death and much more strongly
associated with freedom. Compared with wilderness, cultivated
nature was more weakly associated with death and freedom. The
contrast between wilderness and cultivated nature, which is the
central focus of Studies 2–5, thus renders a more conservative test
of our theoretical analysis than the contrast between wilderness
and the city.
Study 1 sampled only some of the wealth of different thoughts
that people might entertain in wilderness, cultivated, or urban
environments. Moreover, Study 1 was based on self-reports and
thus might be distorted by participants’ cognitive biases, cultural
preconceptions, and self-presentation motives. In spite of these
potential caveats, the results of Study 1 provide preliminary sup-
port for our hypothesis that the confrontation with wilderness
triggers deep existential concerns about death and freedom.
2 Throughout Studies 1–5, no reliable effects of gender emerged. Ac-
cordingly, this variable was dropped from all the analyses.
Table 1
Percentages of Participants (N  90) Inclined to Think More
About Specified Topics in Wild Versus Cultivated Nature, Wild




Wild  cultivated Wild  city Cultivated  city
Relationship
problems 48.9 36.7 35.5
Politics 16.7** 8.9** 12.2**
Family 42.2 48.9 50.0
Personal finances 11.1** 2.2** 11.1**
Death 76.7** 68.9** 60.0*
Art 51.1 43.3 37.8**
Studies 12.2** 4.4** 11.1**
Freedom 81.1** 77.8** 76.7**
Note. Wild  cultivated  percentage more inclined to think about the
specified topic in wild nature than in cultivated nature; wild  city 
percentage more inclined to think about the specified topic in wild nature
than in the city; cultivated  city  percentage more inclined to think
about the specified topic in cultivated nature than in the city.
* p  .08. ** p  .03.
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Study 2
In Study 2, we examined the effects of verbal death reminders
on aesthetic evaluations of nature. Because of the link between
wilderness and death, reminders of death might lead people to
psychologically distance themselves from wilderness. We thus
predicted that reminders of death would lead participants to rate
wilderness as less beautiful. We focused on aesthetic evaluations
because these are among the most validated markers of the psy-
chological quality of nature (Daniel & Vining, 1983; Gifford,
2002; Van den Berg et al., 2003). Moreover, people are able to
judge the aesthetic quality of natural landscapes intuitively,
quickly, and effortlessly. The latter represents a methodological
advantage, because the terror management motives that underlie
distancing from nature presumably operate on intuitive levels
(Goldenberg et al., 2000).
To assess participants’ nature evaluations, we developed a set of
verbal descriptions of a series of Dutch natural landscapes. This
verbal paradigm allowed for a high level of experimental control
and has been validated in previous research (De Groot & Van den
Born, 2003; Van den Berg et al., in press). We focused on Dutch
nature because it was most familiar to our participants. Besides
perceived beauty and cultivation, we assessed two alternative
landscape characteristics, that is, perceived openness and safety/
familiarity. Openness and safety/familiarity are often correlated
with cultivation, with typical cultivated landscapes being more
open and less safe/familiar than wild landscapes, which often
contain dense vegetation. Even so, cultivation cannot be reduced to
openness. For instance, a polar landscape or the Sahara desert
might be perceived as very open and wild at the same time.
Likewise, cultivation should not be equated with safety/familiarity.
Safety/familiarity relates to threats that are explicitly perceived in
the environment, whereas cultivation relates to the more implicit
symbolic threat that is posed by the forces of nature. Accordingly,
we predicted that openness and safety/familiarity would not ex-
plain any variance over and above the variance in cultivation of the
landscapes under study.
Method
Participants and design. Forty-eight paid volunteers at the Vrije Uni-
versiteit Amsterdam (27 women and 21 men, average age 22 years) were
randomly assigned to the experimental conditions. The experimental de-
sign was 2 (death reminders: yes vs. no; between participants)  2
(landscape type: wild vs. cultivated; within participant).3 The main depen-
dent variable consisted of participants’ beauty ratings.
Procedure. The procedure and equipment were similar to Study 1.
After being seated, participants were informed that the investigation con-
sisted of a series of separate studies. The first study contained a number of
personality questionnaires and our death reminder manipulation. Partici-
pants then continued with the second study, which consisted of a reaction
time task and a series of word puzzles. These tasks were interpolated
because mortality salience effects are most pronounced after a brief delay
and distraction (Arndt, Cook, & Routledge, 2004). Participants then moved
on to the third study, during which participants judged the beauty of 17
Dutch natural landscapes. Participants further judged the entire set of
landscapes three additional times to indicate the cultivation, openness, and
safety/familiarity of the landscapes. These perceptions were again scored
on 9-point scales. To measure perceived safety/familiarity of the land-
scapes, we used a scale that was anchored on one side by the Dutch word
vertrouwd, which means both “safe” and “familiar.” The other side of the
scale was anchored by the Dutch word dreigend, which translates as
“threatening.” Following the landscape evaluations, participants were
asked to provide some biographical data regarding their gender and age.
Finally, participants were probed regarding their perceptions of the exper-
iment, debriefed, and paid. During the debriefing, 5 participants expressed
suspicion about the death reminder manipulation. These participants were
excluded from further analyses.
Death reminder manipulation. Death reminders were manipulated as
in prior TMT research (e.g., Florian & Mikulincer, 1997). Participants in
the death reminder condition rated the Dutch Fear of Death Inventory
(FDI-D; Cronbach’s   .81) before evaluating natural landscapes. The
FDI-D consisted of five statements about the fear of death (e.g., “I am
afraid of death, because I must part with my life when I die”; “I am afraid
of death because I will stop thinking after I die”). Participants indicated
their agreement with each statement on 9-point-scales (1  not at all; 9 
completely). The FDI-D was administered at the end of the experimental
session for participants in the no death reminder condition.4
Landscape descriptions. The stimulus set contained verbal descrip-
tions of 17 Dutch natural landscapes that had been generated by three
Dutch landscape experts. These landscapes formed a representative set of
Dutch natural landscapes that varied on the cultivation dimension. Specif-
ically, 7 descriptions referred to highly cultivated landscapes and 5 de-
scriptions referred to wild landscapes. Examples of highly cultivated land-
scapes are “a large-scale landscape with fields, straight ditches and straight
roads” and “a planted forest with rows of thin trees and straight roads.”
3 The analysis of variance (ANOVA) approach is conventional within
social and personality research. Nevertheless, it potentially results in in-
formation loss by neglecting continuous variations in cultivation. To ex-
amine the influence of continuous variations in cultivation, we reanalyzed
the data reported in Studies 2, 3, and 5 using multilevel analysis (Bryk &
Raudenbusch, 1992; for an application in landscape evaluation, see Van
den Berg et al., 1998). Multilevel analysis allows for the testing of our
hypotheses while (a) including landscapes with an infinite range of levels
of cultivation and (b) treating cultivation as a continuous variable. In our
analyses, evaluations of the different landscapes were considered as lower
level observations nested under the upper level unit, persons. As it turned
out, the results of the multilevel analyses were highly similar to those
produced by the ANOVA approach. Because the ANOVA approach is
more conventional and easier to interpret for most readers, we chose to
remain with the ANOVA approach in the main body of this article.
4 Following the suggestion of an anonymous reviewer, we explored
whether our results in Study 2 were moderated by explicit fear of death.
From a TMT perspective, low expressed fear of death may often reflect a
tendency to deny one’s existential fears. Accordingly, individuals with low
expressed fear of death might be especially prone to engage in intuitive
terror management defenses (Greenberg et al., 1995; Harmon-Jones,
Greenberg, Solomon, & Simon, 1996). To address this issue, we performed
a median split on participants FDI-D scores, and performed a 2 (death
reminders: yes or no)  2 (expressed fear of death: high vs. low) between-
participants ANOVA on participants’ average preference for wild over
cultivated nature. This analysis yielded a main effect of death reminders, F
(1, 39)  9.18, p  .005, and a marginal interaction between death
reminders and expressed fear of death, F(1, 39)  2.95, p  .094.
Subsequent tests showed that death reminders led to a significant reduction
in preference for wild over cultivated nature among participants with low
expressed fear of death, F(1, 39)  10.39, p  .004 (M  .80 vs. M 
2.46). Among participants with high expressed fear of death, death remind-
ers led to a nonsignificant reduction in preference for wild over cultivated
nature F(1, 39)  1.26, p .268 (M  1.02 vs. M  1.48). Although this
effect might appear counterintuitive, it is consistent with TMT’s reasoning
that the denial of death anxiety causes terror management defenses to
emerge, rather than death anxiety per se.
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Examples of wild landscapes are “an impenetrable swamp forest, thick
overgrowth, wet grounds, much plant covering” and “a dune landscape
with a view over the sea, hilly, hard low bushes, sand.” Pilot tests within
our participant population confirmed that the cultivated landscapes were
judged as high on cultivation, whereas the wild landscapes were judged as
low on cultivation. The 5 remaining landscapes (included as fillers) were
judged to be intermediate on cultivation.
Results
Perceived cultivation, openness, and safety/familiarity. Culti-
vated landscapes were indeed perceived as more cultivated than
wild landscapes, F(1, 41)  337.41, p  .001 (M  7.91 vs. M 
3.34). Mean cultivation ratings of the five filler landscapes fell in
between these ratings (M  5.58). No effects of death reminders
emerged on cultivation ratings (Fs  1). As expected, wild land-
scapes were perceived as more closed (M  5.28) and as less
safe/familiar (M  4.88) than cultivated landscapes (respective Ms
are 3.52 and 7.18 for openness and safety/familiarity), both ps 
.01. However, cultivated landscapes were still perceived as reliably
more cultivated than wild landscapes after we statistically con-
trolled for perceived openness and safety/familiarity as covariates
(Fs  84, ps  .001). Conversely, when we statistically controlled
for perceived cultivation as a covariate, the differences in per-
ceived openness and safety/familiarity between wild and cultivated
landscapes fell to nonsignificance (Fs  1). Thus, variations in
perceived openness and safety/familiarity did not contribute any
variance over and above the variance in perceived cultivation of
the landscapes under study.
Perceived landscape beauty. We subsequently computed par-
ticipants’ average beauty ratings of the wild and cultivated land-
scapes. The resulting means were subjected to a 2  2 analysis of
variance (ANOVA). This analysis yielded a significant main effect
of cultivation, which indicated that wild landscapes were generally
rated as more beautiful than cultivated landscapes, F(1, 41) 
67.48, p  .001 (M  6.66 vs. M  5.49). This effect replicates
previous research that found a consistent preference for wild over
cultivated Dutch landscapes among highly educated Dutch sam-
ples (Van den Berg, 2003; Van den Berg & Vlek, 1998; Van den
Berg, Vlek, & Coeterier, 1998). In addition, the predicted interac-
tion between death reminders and cultivation was obtained, F(1,
41)  8.18, p  .008. Relevant means are presented in Table 2.
Participants who were reminded of death rated cultivated land-
scapes as somewhat more beautiful than participants who were not
reminded of death, F(1, 41)  2.21, p  .145 (M  5.49 vs. M 
4.95). In addition, participants who were reminded of death rated
wild landscapes as somewhat less beautiful than participants who
were not reminded of death, F(1, 41)  2.22, p  .144 (M  6.44
vs. M  6.90). The results can also be stated in terms of partici-
pants’ relative preference for wild over cultivated landscapes.
When not reminded of death, participants displayed a very strong
preference for wild landscapes over cultivated landscapes, F(1,
20)  66.56, p  .001 (M difference  1.95). When reminded of
death, participants displayed a much weaker preference for wild
landscapes over cultivated landscapes, although this preference
was still reliably different from zero, F(1, 21)  13.40, p  .005
(M difference  0.95). An ANOVA on participants’ average
beauty ratings of the five filler landscapes revealed no significant
effects of death reminders (F  1).
Discussion
As predicted, death reminders led participants in Study 2 to
respond more positively toward cultivated landscapes and less
positively toward wild landscapes. This finding fits with the notion
that terror management concerns sensitize people to the threaten-
ing aspects of wilderness. In addition, the effects of cultivation
were not mediated by differences in perceived openness or safety/
familiarity between wild and cultivated landscapes. This finding
suggests that the effects of death reminders and cultivation are
independent of conscious feelings of threat or unfamiliarity that
arise when people encounter nature. Notably, the effects of famil-
iarity may have been minimized in Study 2 because the landscapes
under study were quite familiar to our Dutch sample.
Study 3
In Study 3, we tested our prediction that action-oriented indi-
viduals would have more positive evaluations of wilderness than
state-oriented individuals. We further introduced some method-
ological innovations. First, our stimulus set included both nature
photographs and verbal descriptions. Photographic nature simula-
tions are the most widely used paradigm in environmental psy-
chology (Gifford, 2002; Hull & Stewart, 1992). People’s evalua-
tions of photographic nature simulations closely match their
reactions to in vivo exposure to nature (Gifford, 2002; Hartig et al.,
2003; Hull & Stewart, 1992) and are strongly and systematically
related to alternative measures of landscape quality (Van den Berg
et al., 2003). Accordingly, it seemed important to test our analysis
using photographic stimuli. Second, we assessed participants’ per-
ceived complexity of the landscape photographs. We predicted that
perceived complexity would not explain any variation over and
above the variation in perceived cultivation of the landscapes
under study.
Method
Participants and design. Sixty paid volunteers at the Vrije Universiteit
Amsterdam (32 women and 28 men, average age 23) participated in the
experiment. On the basis of their scores on the Threat-Related Action
Table 2
Landscape Evaluations as a Function of Death Reminders and





M SD M SD
No (n  22) 4.95 1.21 6.90 0.83
Yes (n  21) 5.49 1.19 6.44 1.17
Note. Ratings were made on scales ranging from 1 (not at all beautiful)
to 9 (very beautiful).
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Orientation (AOT)5 Scale (Kuhl, 1994), participants were classified into
action- or state-oriented individuals. Thus, the experimental design was 2
(AOT: state vs. action; between subjects)  2 (type of nature: wild vs.
cultivated; within subject). The main dependent variable consisted of
participants’ beauty ratings of the landscape photographs and descriptions.
Procedure. The procedure and equipment were largely similar to those
used in Studies 1 and 2. After being seated, participants first completed
some personality questionnaires, which included the AOT Scale. Partici-
pants then moved on to an unrelated study, which lasted about 15 min.
Next, participants evaluated a series of nature photographs and nature
descriptions. The verbal stimulus set consisted of the same descriptions of
17 Dutch natural landscapes that were used in Study 2. Subsequently, all
participants provided some biographical data regarding their gender and
age. Finally, participants were probed regarding their perceptions of the
experiment, debriefed, and paid.
Measurement of action orientation. The AOT Scale has been devel-
oped and extensively validated by Kuhl and others (for an overview, see
Kuhl & Beckmann, 1994a). Effects of AOT have been found across a wide
range of different measures and domains, including cognitive performance,
event-related brain potentials, medicine intake, therapeutic outcomes, ath-
letic performance, and work psychology. Research indicated that the ef-
fects of AOT are not due to self-efficacy or control beliefs (Kuhl, 1981),
achievement motivation (Heckhausen & Strang, 1988), neuroticism (Bau-
mann & Kuhl, 2002), extraversion (Koole, 2004b), self-esteem (Koole &
Jostmann, 2004), or conscious emotion regulation strategies (Koole,
2004b), and they occur over and above the effects of the Big Five
personality dimensions (Diefendorff et al., 2000).
Each of the items of the AOT describes a particular situation that
requires the use of self-regulatory skills and two alternative ways of coping
with the situation. One of these alternatives always refers to action-oriented
coping with the situation, whereas the other alternative refers to state-
oriented coping. Illustrative items are “When I have lost something that is
very valuable to me and I cannot find it anywhere”: (a) “I have a hard time
concentrating on anything else” or (b) “I put it out of my mind after a little
while” and “When I am being told that my work is completely unsatisfac-
tory”: (a) “I do not let it bother me for too long” or (b) “I feel paralyzed.”
For these respective items, the action-oriented choices are b and a. For each
item, participants were asked to choose which of two alternative responses
would best describe their reaction. Notably, the AOT does not ask partic-
ipants to provide introspective judgments of their self-regulation abilities
but rather asks them to report on the consequences that these volitional
abilities have for their behavior. This minimal reliance on introspection is
intended to enhance the measure’s ability to tap into unconscious self-
regulation skills (Kuhl & Koole, 2004).
We coded action-oriented choices as 1 and state-oriented choices as 0
(Cronbach’s   .82). Participants who made seven or more action-
oriented choices on the AOT were classified as action oriented, the re-
maining participants were classified as state oriented. This cutoff point
represents the conceptual midpoint of the AOT and was the normative
midpoint in a large-scale study among Dutch university students (N 
1,460).
Nature photographs. The stimulus set consisted of 28 high-resolution
color photographs of natural landscapes. These landscapes formed a rep-
resentative set of West-European natural landscapes that varied in degree
of human influence. Following Van den Berg et al. (1998), we restricted
the kinds of human influence studied to visible signs of regulative activi-
ties, such as mowing, horticulture, and other signs of activities that indicate
human control over nature. On the basis of pilot-testing studies, 13 land-
scapes were classified as wild natural landscapes. The remaining 15 land-
scapes were classified as cultivated natural landscapes. Each of the land-
scape photographs appeared in a 20-  27-cm format on the computer
screen. After 3 s, a 9-point rating scale was superimposed on the landscape
photograph and participants were asked to type in their beauty ratings (1 
not at all beautiful; 9  very beautiful). The landscapes were presented in
a different random order for each participant. After providing beauty
ratings, participants were again presented with the set of landscape pho-
tographs, this time in a 6.5-  10.5-cm format. During this second
presentation, participants rated the cultivation and complexity of the land-
scapes, again on 9-point scales (1  very little; 9  very much).
Results
Perceived cultivation and complexity. Cultivated landscape
photographs were indeed perceived as more cultivated than wild
landscape photographs, F(1, 58)  281.12, p  .001 (M  7.24 vs.
M  3.67). Perceived cultivation was unaffected by AOT, Fs  1.
Unexpectedly, wild nature photographs were perceived as less
complex than the cultivated nature photographs, F(1, 58)  33.63,
p  .001 (M  4.71 vs. M  5.60). However, cultivated land-
scapes were still perceived as reliably more cultivated than wild
landscapes after we statistically controlled for perceived complex-
ity, F(1, 58)  157.66, p  .001. Conversely, when we statistically
controlled for perceived cultivation, the differences in perceived
complexity between wild and cultivated landscapes fell to nonsig-
nificance, F(1, 58)  1.18, p  .280. Thus, perceived complexity
did not vary between the wild and cultivated landscapes over and
above the variance that was explained by perceived cultivation.
Perceived beauty of nature photographs. We computed par-
ticipants’ average beauty ratings of the photographs of wild versus
cultivated landscapes and subjected these to a 2 (AOT)  2 (nature
type) ANOVA. Relevant means are displayed in the nature pho-
tograph column of Table 3. The analysis revealed a significant
effect of landscape type, which indicated that wild landscapes were
generally rated as more beautiful than cultivated landscapes, F(1,
58)  23.05, p  .001 (M  6.55 vs. M  5.94). In addition, the
predicted interaction between action orientation and nature type
was significant, F(1, 58)  6.67, p  .02. Subsequent tests
revealed that only action-oriented participants displayed a clear
preference for wild over cultivated landscapes, F(1, 25)  23.36,
p  .001 (M difference  0.97). State-oriented participants, by
contrast, displayed only a marginal preference for wild over cul-
tivated landscapes, F(1, 33)  2.90, p  .098 (M difference 
0.30). Another way to interpret this interaction is to note that
action-oriented participants evaluated wild landscapes as nonsig-
nificantly more beautiful than state-oriented participants, F(1,
58)  2.08, p  .155 (M  6.85 vs. M  6.32), whereas
action-oriented participants evaluated cultivated landscapes as
nonsignificantly less beautiful than state-oriented participants, F(1,
58)  1 (M  5.83 vs. M  6.02). As in Study 2, the results were
stronger for relative preference for wilderness than for the separate
evaluations of each nature type.
Perceived beauty of nature descriptions. We then computed
participants’ average beauty ratings of the verbal descriptions of
wild versus cultivated landscapes. The correlation between partic-
ipants’ relative preference for wild over cultivated nature in pho-
tographic and verbal landscape simulations was substantial,
5 Kuhl (1994) introduced the label “failure-related” action orientation to
refer to the AOT Scale. However, we prefer the label “threat-related,”
because the effects of AOT are theoretically not specific to failure but
rather involve a broad range of psychological threats, including negative
affect (Baumann & Kuhl, 2002), external pressure (Kazén et al., 2003), and
controlling relationship partners (Koole, 2004a).
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r(60)  .75, p  .001. The results for verbal descriptions con-
verged with the results for photographic landscapes. A 2 (AOT) 
2 (nature type) ANOVA yielded an effect of landscape type, which
indicated that wild landscapes were generally rated as more beau-
tiful than cultivated landscapes, F(1, 58)  60.40, p  .001 (M 
6.10 vs. M  4.21). In addition, the predicted interaction between
AOT and nature type was significant, F(1, 58)  5.29, p  .03. As
can be seen in the nature descriptions column of Table 3, the
obtained pattern was very similar to the pattern obtained for
photographic simulations. There was only one substantive differ-
ence in relation to the landscape photographs: Evaluations of
cultivated landscapes were lower for the verbal descriptions than
for the photographs. This difference fits with prior research show-
ing that verbal labels that imply human influence are often nega-
tively evaluated (Hodgson & Thayer, 1980; Tahvanainen, Tirvä-
inen, Ihalainen, Vuorela, & Kohlemainen, 2000).
Discussion
As predicted, action-oriented participants displayed a stronger
preference for wild nature than state-oriented participants, across
evaluations of both landscape photographs and verbal descriptions.
The close convergence between photographs and verbal descrip-
tions attests to the robustness of the effects of action orientation
and validates the use of verbal descriptions of nature in Studies
1–3. Additional analyses showed that wild landscapes were per-
ceived as less complex than cultivated landscapes, even though
wild landscapes were generally rated as more beautiful than cul-
tivated landscapes. Though we did not explicitly predict this find-
ing, it is consistent with our theoretical perspective. Even when
wilderness is perceptually simple (e.g., the Sahara desert), its
uncontrollability may signal a lack of existential security. Notably,
our analyses indicated that differences in perceived complexity did
not contribute any variance over and above the variance that was
explained by perceived cultivation of the landscapes in Study 3.
Thus, even though wild landscapes were perceived as less complex
than cultivated landscapes, this effect could not explain the effects
of cultivation on beauty ratings.
Study 4
Why would action orientation be associated with more positive
evaluations of wilderness? On the basis of PSI theory (Kuhl, 2000;
Kuhl & Koole, 2004), we suspect that action-oriented individuals
are more efficient at suppressing the association between wilder-
ness and death than state-oriented individuals. Presumably, action-
oriented suppression is mediated by nonconscious mechanisms
that are more effective than consciously intended suppression,
which often leads to a rebound of unwanted mental contents
(Wegner, 1994). By suppressing the dark side of wilderness,
action-oriented individuals may be able enjoy the bright side of
wilderness more than state-oriented individuals.
In Study 4, we took a closer look at the suppression skills of
action- versus state-oriented individuals. To this end, we first
exposed participants to a series of photographs of wilderness. This
manipulation was expected to trigger suppression of the dark side
of wilderness among action-oriented participants. To track the
dynamics of the suppression process, we used a primed lexical-
decision task. In this task, participants had to decide whether letter
strings on a computer screen are words or nonwords. Among the
target letter strings, we included words related to mortality, vital-
ity, punishment, and reward. Prior to the presentation of each
target letter string, we briefly primed either words related to
wilderness or words related to cultivated nature. On the basis of
past research, strength of associations was indicated by the facil-
itation or inhibition of lexical-decision latencies due to the lexical
primes (e.g., Koole, Smeets, Van Knippenberg, & Dijksterhuis,
1999; Mussweiler & Förster, 2000; Wentura, 2000). Because the
lexical-decision task did not include neutral primes, we use the
terms facilitation, inhibition, and suppression only in a relative
sense.
Our key prediction in Study 4 was that action-oriented partici-
pants would suppress the association between wilderness and
death after viewing wilderness photographs. Action-oriented indi-
viduals should therefore display a slowdown in lexical-decision
latencies to mortality words that were primed with wilderness
words rather than cultivated nature words. This suppression effect
was not predicted to occur among state-oriented individuals, who
presumably are not equipped with the same suppression skills as
action-oriented individuals. After being primed with wilderness
photographs, state-oriented individuals were expected to show an
association between wilderness and death. State-oriented individ-
uals should therefore display faster lexical decisions to mortality
words that were primed with wilderness words rather than culti-
vated nature words.
Study 4 also included a control group of participants who were
exposed to photographs of cultivated nature. We expected that this
control condition would not trigger suppression among action-
oriented participants. Thus, after viewing cultivated nature, action-
Table 3
Beauty Ratings of Wild and Cultivated Nature as a Function of Type of Simulation and Action
Orientation, Study 3
Orientation
Nature photographs Nature descriptions
Cultivated Wild Cultivated Wild
M SD M SD M SD M SD
Action (n  34) 5.83 1.26 6.85 1.28 3.97 1.63 6.51 1.60
State (n  26) 6.02 1.30 6.32 1.50 4.41 1.34 5.79 1.52
Note. Ratings were made on scales ranging from 1 (not at all beautiful) to 9 (very beautiful).
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orientated participants were expected to display an association
between wilderness and mortality. By contrast, we reasoned that
viewing cultivated nature might help state-oriented participants to
inhibit the association between wilderness and death. This is
because cultivated nature symbolically conveys that human civi-
lization can control the wild forces of nature. Past research has
indeed found that state-oriented individuals benefit greatly from an
emotionally supportive environment (Koole, Kuhl, Jostmann, &
Vohs, 2005). Viewing cultivated nature might thus allow state-
oriented individuals to disconnect nature from their concerns with
death. We did not predict the latter effect for action-oriented
participants, because action-oriented individuals are inclined to
shield themselves against social influences, even when these in-
fluences are emotionally comforting (Koole, 2004a; Kuhl & Ka-
zén, 1994).
Method
Participants and design. Forty-eight paid volunteers at the Vrije Uni-
versiteit Amsterdam (29 women and 19 men, average age 21 years)
participated in the experiment. On the basis of their scores on the AOT
Scale, we classified participants as action- or state-oriented individuals.
Thus, the experimental design was 2 (AOT: action vs. state; between
participants)  2 (photographic prime: wild vs. cultivated nature; between
participants)  2 (lexical prime: wild vs. cultivated nature; within partic-
ipants)  2 (target category: natural vs. social; within participants)  2
(target valence: negative vs. positive; within participants).
Procedure. The procedure and equipment were similar to those used in
Studies 1–3. After being seated, participants first completed some person-
ality questionnaires, which included the AOT Scale (  .83). Next,
participants performed a dot-recognition task that contained our nature
photograph priming manipulation. Following the dot-recognition task,
participants continued with an unrelated filler task, which lasted about 5
min. Participants then proceeded with the primed lexical-decision task.
Participants subsequently completed some unrelated studies and provided
some biographical data then were debriefed and paid.
Photographic priming. Participants were told that the investigators
were interested in the speed of visual perception processes. During the task,
photographs of landscapes would be flashed on the computer screen. In
between these landscapes, red dots would appear on the screen. Partici-
pants’ task was to count the number of red dots in between the landscapes.
Participants were shown two sets of landscapes. The first set consisted of
six landscapes that were interspersed with four red dots, the second set
consisted of five landscapes that were interspersed with three red dots. The
landscapes and dots were presented for about 100 ms before they were
replaced by the next stimulus. We used these brief presentations to ensure
that we evoked participants’ intuitive reactions to the landscapes. In the
wilderness photographs condition, the two sets of landscapes consisted of
Dutch natural landscapes that had been pretested as relatively wild. In the
cultivated nature photographs condition, the two sets of landscapes con-
sisted of Dutch natural landscapes that had been pretested as relatively
cultivated.
Primed lexical-decision task. During the lexical-decision task, partic-
ipants were informed that a number of letter strings would appear individ-
ually in the center of the computer screen. Some of these strings would be
genuine words, whereas others would be nonwords. Participants were to
decide as quickly and accurately as possible whether the presented letter
string was a word or nonword. Each trial began with the presentation of a
row of five xs that remained in the center of the computer screen for 1 s.
The xs were replaced by a priming word, which remained on the computer
screen for 16 ms. Previous research has shown that prime words cannot be
consciously detected at such brief intervals (Arndt et al., 2004). The
priming word was replaced by the target letter string, which remained on
screen until participants had pressed an appropriate response button. If the
letter string was an existing word, participants had to press the “A” button
(left of the keyboard); if the letter string was a nonword, participants had
to press the “6” button (right of the keyboard).
After 4 warm-up trials, participants proceeded with 112 experimental
trials. Half of these trials had words as targets: seven words were related to
nature and mortality (cadaver, skull, maggots, decomposition, fatal,
corpse, cancer), seven words were related to nature and vitality (flowers,
birds, spacious, creek, blossom, water, nature), seven words were related
to social punishment ( punishment, hate, scold, badger, mean, lie, sneaky),
and seven words were related to social reward (reward, love, kiss, stroke,
tender, truth, honest). The target words were presented twice: once pre-
ceded by one of seven wilderness primes ( prairie, swamp, desert, savan-
nah, primeval forest, wilderness, jungle) and once preceded by one of
seven cultivated nature primes (meadow, polder, community garden, park,
public garden, field, golf course). Each prime word was paired equally
often with one of the four target categories. Note that the prime words were
all single words in Dutch, because subliminal priming effects are most
reliable for single words (Greenwald, 1992). The remaining half of the
experimental trials had nonwords as targets. The presentation order of the
trials was randomized for each participant, and response latencies were
recorded using appropriate software.
Results
Before analyzing the results, we first removed wrong responses
from the lexical-decision task (1.5% of all responses). To reduce
skewness of the data, we converted lexical-decision latencies
longer than 1,000 ms (i.e., more than 3 standard deviations above
the mean; 6.8% of all responses) into 1,000 ms.
We subjected average lexical-decision latencies to a 2 (AOT) 
2 (photographic prime)  2 (lexical prime)  2 (target cate-
gory)  2 (target valence) ANOVA. The analysis yielded a main
effect of target valence, which indicated that lexical decisions were
faster to positive than to negative targets, F(1, 44)  51.35, p 
.001 (M  623 vs. M  655). The analysis further yielded a set of
two-, three-, and four-way interactions and the predicted five-way
interaction between AOT, photographic prime, lexical prime, tar-
get category, and target valence, F(1, 44)  3.90, p  .055. The
latter effect indicated that it was appropriate to analyze the results
separately by target category. For each word type, we found a
significant two-way interaction between AOT and photographic
prime ( ps  .05). Across each word type, action-oriented partic-
ipants generally displayed slower lexical decisions after viewing
wild rather than cultivated nature, F(1, 44)  3.99, p  .052 (M 
679 vs. M  622). State-oriented participants displayed a trend in
the opposite direction, but this effect was not significant, F(1,
44)  1.48, p  .228 (M  606 vs. M  643). No other effects
emerged for words related to vitality, punishment, and reward.
For mortality words, the analysis also yielded a three-way
interaction between AOT, photographic prime, and lexical prime,
F(1, 44)  23.26, p  .001. Relevant means are displayed in Table
4. We proceeded with more focused tests. In the condition in
which participants had been exposed to wild nature photographs,
there emerged a main effect of AOT, F(1, 22)  7.05, p  .02,
consistent with slower lexical decisions among action- versus
state-oriented participants (M  716 vs. M  633). There was also
an interaction between AOT and lexical prime, F(1, 22)  15.14,
p  .002. After viewing wild nature, action-oriented participants
were slower to respond to mortality words when these were primed
by wilderness words rather than cultivated nature words, F(1,
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12)  8.23, p  .02 (M  737 vs. M  695). By contrast, after
viewing wild nature, state-oriented participants were quicker to
respond to mortality words when these were primed by wilderness
words rather than cultivated nature words, F(1, 10)  7.02, p 
.03 (M  611 vs. M  654).
In the condition in which participants had been exposed to
cultivated nature photographs, there was also an interaction be-
tween AOT and lexical prime, F(1, 22)  8.68, p  .008. How-
ever, the pattern of means was opposite to the pattern in the wild
nature photographs condition. After viewing cultivated nature,
action-oriented participants were quicker to respond to mortality
words when these were primed by wilderness words rather than
cultivated nature words, F(1, 12)  5.01, p  .05 (M  631 vs.
M  662). By contrast, after viewing cultivated nature, state-
oriented participants were somewhat slower to respond to mortal-
ity words when these were primed by wilderness words rather than
cultivated nature words, F(1, 10)  3.77, p  .081 (M  689 vs.
M  655).
Discussion
After viewing wilderness, action-oriented participants’ re-
sponses to death words were inhibited by priming wilderness
words. This finding supports the notion that action-oriented indi-
viduals suppress the association between wilderness and death
after viewing wilderness. Notably, after action-oriented partici-
pants viewed cultivated nature, their responses to death words
were facilitated by priming wilderness words. The latter finding
may be interpreted in terms of the terror management needs of
action-oriented individuals. Cultivated nature symbolizes the tam-
ing of the forces of nature. Thus, when individuals are exposed to
cultivated nature, the association between wilderness and death is
unlikely to give rise to terror management concerns. By contrast,
wilderness conveys no symbolic taming of the forces of nature.
Thus, when individuals are exposed to wilderness, the association
between wilderness and death is likely to trigger terror manage-
ment concerns. Overall, it appears that action-oriented individuals
only suppress the association between wilderness and death when
doing so serves their terror management needs. This sensitivity to
context suggests that action-oriented individuals are quite flexible
in their suppression processes, even though these processes unfold
on subliminal levels (see also Koole & Jostmann, 2004; Koole &
Kuhl, in press).
There was an unexpected slowdown in lexical-decision latencies
among action-oriented participants after viewing wilderness. In
prior research, such a slowdown in responding has been associated
with bringing self-regulation processes online (Kazén, Baumann,
& Kuhl, 2003). The observed slowdown in lexical decision times
among action-oriented participants thus suggests that action-
oriented participants used active self-regulation in coping with the
dark side of wilderness. This additional evidence therefore fits
with our reasoning that action-oriented individuals engaged in
more self-regulation processes after viewing wilderness than after
viewing cultivated nature.
State-oriented participants displayed a complete reversal of the
associations that were found among action-oriented participants.
After viewing wilderness, state-oriented participants activated the
association between wilderness and death. This effect suggests that
encounters with wilderness serve to potentiate automatic associa-
tions between wilderness and death among state-oriented partici-
pants. After viewing cultivated nature, however, state-oriented
participants displayed an inhibited association between wilderness
and death. Presumably, encounters with cultivated nature provide
state-oriented individuals with symbolic assurance that the wild
forces of nature can be controlled by human civilization.
Study 5
On the basis of Study 4’s findings, action-oriented individuals
seem particularly efficient in suppressing death thoughts in their
encounters with wilderness. However, there are times when the
psychological confrontation with death may be inevitable even for
action-oriented individuals. When exposed to direct death remind-
ers, even the most efficient suppression skills are unlikely to keep
death thoughts at bay. Consequently, direct death reminders may
sensitize action-oriented individuals to the dark side of wilderness
and thereby lower their evaluations of wilderness. By contrast, as
Study 4 indicates, merely viewing wilderness seems already suf-
ficient to highlight the problem of death among state-oriented
individuals. Consequently, direct death reminders might have no
added impact on state-oriented individuals’ evaluations of
wilderness.
We designed Study 5 to address the interactive effects of action
orientation and direct death reminders on nature evaluation. We
further included some additional methodological improvements.
First, we used a subliminal priming method to manipulate direct
death reminders (Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski,
1997). Second, we contrasted death priming with both neutral and
aversive priming control conditions. In the neutral priming condi-
tion, participants were subliminally primed with four xs. In the
aversive priming condition, participants were subliminally primed
with the word pain. This second control condition allowed us to
examine whether our results were indeed specific to death con-
cerns or whether they were due to general accessibility of aversive
cognitions. Finally, we included a systematic assessment of par-
ticipants’ mood changes. Past TMT research has found little evi-
dence that verbal death primes influence mood, even though verbal
death primes reliably elicit defensive responses (Greenberg,
Table 4
Lexical Decision Latencies of Natural Mortality Words as a
Function of Action Orientation, Photographic Priming, and











M 737 695 631 662
SD 90 98 54 73
State
M 611 653 689 654
SD 61 98 107 91
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Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). We therefore predicted no effects
of subliminal death reminders on subjective mood.
Method
Participants and design. One hundred fifteen paid volunteers at the
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam (72 women and 43 men, average age 23
years) participated in the experiment. On the basis of their scores on the
AOT Scale, we classified participants into action- versus state-oriented
individuals. Thus, the experimental design was 2 (AOT: state vs. action;
between participants)  3 (subliminal priming: xxxx vs. death vs. pain;
between participants)  2 (nature type: wild vs. cultivated; within
participants).
Procedure. The procedure and equipment were similar to those used in
Study 2. Participants first completed some personality questionnaires,
which included the AOT Scale (Cronbach’s   .80). Next, participants
rated their moods. Participants then moved on to a study “on word
associations,” which contained our subliminal priming manipulation. Fol-
lowing this task, participants rated their moods for a second time and
performed a brief filler task. After this, participants evaluated the same set
of landscape photographs as in Study 3, completed another filler, and rated
their moods for a third time. Subsequently, all participants provided some
biographical data regarding their gender and age. Finally, participants were
probed regarding their perceptions of the experiment, debriefed, paid, and
dismissed.
Subliminal priming manipulation. The subliminal priming task was
modeled after Arndt et al. (1997). Participants were told that for each trial
of the word-completion test, two words would be presented sequentially on
the computer screen. Some of these word pairs were related, such as rose
and flower, whereas other word pairs were unrelated, such as cabbage and
rope. After each word pair, participants were asked to type “1” to signify
that the words were unrelated or “2” to signify that the words were related.
Participants were instructed to keep their eyes fixed on the center of the
screen because the word pairs would be presented very briefly on the
computer screen. Participants were also told that the computer would
randomly select a second word from a list after the presentation of the first
word, so that they might sometimes see a brief flash in between the
presentation of the two words. After these instructions, participants re-
ceived two practice items. The correct answer to these items was provided,
and participants were offered the opportunity to practice again if they
wished.
Participants proceeded with the word-relation test. Each of the 10 trials
consisted of a sequential presentation of three stimuli centered on the
screen. The first and third words were the words for which the participants
were supposed to determine the presence or absence of a relationship. In
reality, these words served as a forward mask (and fixation point) and
backward mask, respectively. The critical subliminal prime was presented
between the two mask words for 34 ms. In the death priming condition, the
subliminal prime was dood (Dutch for death or dead). In the xxxx priming
condition, the subliminal prime was a string of four xs. In the pain priming
condition, the subliminal prime was pijn (Dutch for pain).
Mood measurement. During the three consecutive mood assessments,
participants rated the brief Profile of Mood Scales (POMS; Shacham,
1983) that were translated into Dutch (Van den Berg et al., 2003). The 32
POMS items formed five subscales, which assessed feelings of depression,
anger, tension, vigor, and anxiety. Cronbach’s alphas for the POMS scales
ranged between .83 and .95 across the three separate measurements.
Results
Subliminality check. At the end of the experiment, participants
were probed regarding their awareness of the subliminal primes
that were presented during the word-relation test, using a funneled
debriefing procedure (Bargh & Chartrand, 2000). During this
procedure, 5 participants claimed that they had seen an additional
word being flashed on the computer screen in between the two test
words. These 5 participants were unable to guess which word had
been flashed when the priming word was presented along with
three alternative words. Even so, they might have been able to
detect some of the subliminal primes. Hence, we removed the 5
suspicious participants from the dataset.
Perceived cultivation and complexity. Participants perceived
the cultivated landscapes to be more cultivated than the wild
landscapes, F(1, 110)  719.25, p  .001 (M  7.19 vs. M 
3.77). Perceptions of cultivation were not affected by AOT or the
subliminal priming manipulation (Fs  1). As in Study 3, wild
nature was perceived as less complex than cultivated nature, F(1,
110)  87.25, p  .001 (M  4.52 vs. M  5.60). However, the
cultivated landscapes were still perceived as reliably more culti-
vated after we statistically controlled for perceived complexity as
a covariate, F(1, 109)  370.91, p  .001. Conversely, when we
statistically controlled for perceived cultivation as a covariate, the
differences in perceived complexity between wild and cultivated
landscapes fell to nonsignificance, F(1, 109)  1. Thus, variations
in perceived complexity did not contribute any variance over and
above the difference in perceived cultivation between the wild
versus cultivated landscapes.
Beauty ratings. We subjected participants’ average beauty rat-
ings to a 2 (AOT)  3 (subliminal priming)  2 (nature type)
ANOVA. This analysis yielded a main effect of nature type, F(1,
105)  46.57, p  .001, which indicated that average beauty
ratings for wild nature were higher than average beauty ratings for
cultivated nature (M  6.37 vs. M  5.69). In addition, the
analysis revealed a two-way interaction between AOT and sub-
liminal priming, F(2, 105)  3.32, p  .05, a two-way interaction
between AOT and nature type, F(1, 105)  5.00, p  .03, and the
predicted three-way interaction between AOT, subliminal priming,
and nature type, F(2, 105)  4.66, p  .02. Relevant means are
displayed in Table 5.
To facilitate interpretation of the results, we subtracted partici-
pants’ evaluations of cultivated nature from their evaluations of
wild nature, such that higher scores indicated greater preference
for wilderness. We then conducted separate tests among action-
and state-oriented individuals. Among state-oriented individuals,
subliminal priming had no significant effects ( ps  .10). By
contrast, among action-oriented individuals, subliminal priming
Table 5
Beauty Ratings of Wild and Cultivated Nature as a Function of
Subliminal Priming and Action Orientation, Study 5
Subliminal prime
Action orientation State orientation
xxxx Pain Death xxxx Pain Death
Wild nature
M 6.65 7.31 6.08 6.17 5.95 6.70
SD 1.11 0.57 1.32 1.38 1.38 1.02
Cultivated nature
M 5.25 6.04 5.67 5.81 5.61 5.85
SD 1.37 1.19 1.08 1.14 0.99 1.27
Note. Ratings were made on scales ranging from 1 (not at all beautiful)
to 9 (very beautiful).
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significantly influenced preference for wilderness, F(2, 42) 
3.64, p  .04. Follow-up tests showed that action-oriented partic-
ipants primed with xxxx or pain had an equally strong preference
for wilderness, F  1 (M  1.40 vs. M  1.27). Action-oriented
participants who had been primed with death, however, had lower
preference for wilderness than action-oriented participants primed
with xxxx, F(1, 42)  6.17, p  .02 (M  .41 vs. M  1.27), and
action-oriented participants primed with pain, F(1, 42)  3.87,
p  .056 (M  .41 vs. M  1.40). Another way to interpret the
interaction pattern is to note that action-oriented participants had a
stronger relative preference for wilderness than state-oriented par-
ticipants after being primed with xxxx, F(1, 36)  8.65, p  .007,
and after being primed with pain, F(1, 34)  7.10, p  .02. After
being primed with death, however, action-oriented participants
had an equally low preference for wilderness as state-oriented
individuals (F  1).
We also examined our results separately for wild versus culti-
vated nature. For beauty ratings of cultivated nature, no significant
effects emerged ( ps  .10). For beauty ratings of wild nature, the
analysis revealed a marginal main effect of AOT, F(1, 105) 
2.84, p  .095, which was qualified by an interaction effect
between AOT and subliminal priming, F(2, 105)  5.53, p  .006.
Subsequent tests revealed that action-oriented participants rated
wild nature as nonsignificantly more beautiful than state-oriented
participants after being primed with xxxx, F(1, 36)  1.30, p 
.265, and significantly so after being primed with pain, F(1, 34) 
9.67, p  .005. After being primed with death, however, action-
oriented participants rated wild nature as nonsignificantly less
beautiful than state-oriented participants, F(1, 35)  2.53, p 
.120. Overall, as in Studies 2 and 3, the effects were stronger for
relative preference than for absolute beauty ratings of wilderness.
Mood ratings. Mood ratings were scored such that higher
ratings signified higher negative affect (all Cronbach’s s  .95).
We performed a 2 (AOT)  3 (subliminal priming)  3 (time)
ANOVA on participants’ average mood ratings. The analysis
revealed no effects of subliminal priming ( ps  .10). Similar
results were found when the subscales of the POMS were analyzed
separately. Average mood ratings were uncorrelated with ratings
of wild or cultivate nature ( ps  .10) and the results obtained for
beauty ratings did not change when mood ratings were included as
covariates.
Discussion
As predicted, subliminal death reminders inhibited the influence
of action orientation on nature evaluation. When participants were
subliminally primed with neutral words or pain, action orientation
was positively related to preference for wilderness. The nondeath
priming conditions thus mirrored the results of Study 3. However,
when participants were subliminally primed with death, the influ-
ence of action orientation on preference for wilderness was
eliminated.
State-oriented participants displayed relatively low evaluations
of wilderness regardless of whether they were primed with death
or not. The lower reactivity of state-oriented participants compared
with their action-oriented counterparts to verbal death reminders
may be explained by Study 4’s observation that state-oriented
participants activate death thoughts in response to wilderness even
in the absence of direct death reminders. Accordingly, the death
primes in Study 5 may not have affected state-oriented participants
because state-participants were already attuned to the psycholog-
ical threat of wilderness.
Unexpectedly, death priming led to a nonsignificant trend
among state-oriented participants to increase their preference for
wilderness. It should be noted that this trend did not contribute to
the statistical significance of our predicted effects, because our
results were reliable even when action-oriented participants were
considered separately. Speculatively, the confrontation with the
double threat of death reminders and wilderness may have led
some state-oriented individuals to downplay the threat of wilder-
ness on a conscious level. This conscious strategy may be analo-
gous to the trivialization strategies that people use to reduce
cognitive dissonance after alternative dissonance reduction strate-
gies have been blocked (Simon, Greenberg, & Brehm, 1995).
However, we caution against heavy-handed interpretations of the
effect of subliminal death priming among state-oriented partici-
pants, given that this effect was not statistically reliable.
Some other aspects of Study 5 are also noteworthy. First, pain
primes did not yield similar effects as death primes. Thus, our
central results appear to be uniquely due to death concerns, as
opposed to any kind of negative rumination. Second, Study 5
found no evidence that the effects of verbal death primes and
action orientation on nature evaluation were mediated by changes
in subjective mood, a finding that is consistent with previous TMT
research (Arndt et al., 2004). Finally, Study 5 replicated Study 3’s
finding that the effects of wild versus cultivated nature were not
mediated by differences in perceived complexity between these
different nature types.
Would we have obtained similar results if we had used supra-
liminal death reminders? Although we do not have direct evidence
on this matter, Study 4 showed that the effects of action orientation
are capable of operating on subliminal levels. Moreover, past TMT
research indicates that the effects of subliminal death primes are
qualitatively similar to the effects of supraliminal death primes
(Arndt et al., 2004). Finally, Kazén, Baumann, and Kuhl (2004)
found that action-oriented individuals show increases in world-
view defense after supraliminal death primes, even to a greater
degree than state-oriented individuals. Although more research is
needed, the available evidence suggests that supraliminal death
primes are likely to have similar effects on nature evaluation as
subliminal death primes.
General Discussion
The present findings confirm the relevance of terror manage-
ment motives in human–nature relations (Goldenberg et al., 2000).
Indeed, Study 1 showed that wilderness environments were more
strongly associated with death ruminations than were cultivated or
urban environments. On the basis of the psychological association
between wilderness and death, we hypothesized that terror man-
agement concerns may sensitize people to the dark side of wilder-
ness. Consistent with this, Study 2 showed that death reminders
subdued people’s appreciation of the beauty of wilderness. Study
4 found evidence that associations between wilderness and death
are even influential on subliminal levels. Importantly, both Studies
1 and 4 showed that wilderness was not associated with negative
ruminations in general. The dark side of wilderness thus relates
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specifically to the problem of death (Koole & Van den Berg,
2004).
Some people seem capable of suppressing the dark side of
wilderness. Indeed, Study 4 found that action-oriented individuals
unconsciously suppressed the association between wilderness and
death after encountering wilderness. Even so, action-oriented in-
dividuals cannot completely escape the dark side of wilderness.
Study 5 showed that direct reminders of death can induce action-
oriented individuals to lower their evaluations of wilderness. Thus,
even highly efficient suppression skills may not compensate for
the increase in death-thought accessibility that results from direct
death reminders. As Study 4 showed, state-oriented individuals are
not equipped with the same suppression skills as action-oriented
individuals. It thus seems understandable that state-oriented indi-
viduals had a markedly lower appreciation of wilderness relative to
action-oriented individuals in Studies 3 and 5. By contrast, state-
oriented individuals appear to be relatively favorably disposed
toward cultivated nature. Cultivated nature may thus provide the
most suitable setting for state-oriented individuals to enjoy some
of the positive benefits of nature.
The present research also found support for a bright side of
wilderness. First, Study 1 showed that participants were more
inclined to think about freedom in the wilderness than in either
cultivated nature or the city. Second, there was a general trend
among participants in Studies 2, 3, and 5 to rate wilderness as
relatively beautiful. Indeed, the lowest average beauty rating of
wilderness in the present research was 5.79, which is well above
the conceptual midpoint of the 9-point scales that were being used.
This general liking of wilderness, at least on the surface, might
seem at odds with our contention that wilderness is intrinsically
associated with terror management concerns. However, partici-
pants in the present research were judging wilderness landscapes
in the safety and comfort of a psychological laboratory. Within this
artificial context, levels of psychological threat that were associ-
ated wilderness were probably minimal. People’s affective reac-
tions toward wilderness are likely to be more intense during actual
wilderness experiences, for instance during heavy storms or en-
counters with wild animals (Van den Berg & Ter Heijne, 2004).
Under more realistic conditions, therefore, the influence of terror
management concerns on nature evaluation may be considerably
enhanced.
Limitations and Future Perspectives
The present research only studied reactions to simulated envi-
ronments. Fortunately, people’s reactions to simulated and actual
environments show considerable convergence (Coeterier, 1983;
Gifford, 2002; Hull & Stewart, 1992). There are thus grounds to
believe that the present results will generalize to real-life encoun-
ters with nature. Another limitation is that the present research
used only Dutch participants. There is reason to suspect, however,
that our findings are relevant to other cultures as well. Investiga-
tions in other countries, such as the United States, have corrobo-
rated people’s fears of wilderness (Bixler & Floyd, 1997) and the
importance of having an action-oriented mindset to overcome such
fears (Kaplan & Kaplan, 1989; Korpela, Hartig, Kaiser, & Führer,
2001). Still, it would be important to extend the present findings to
other cultures, in particular cultures that advocate more ecocentric
views on human–nature relations (Buttel, 1987; Catton & Dunlap,
1980).
Though many questions await future research, the present re-
search attests to the great potential for integration between per-
sonality/motivation theory and environmental psychology. Tradi-
tionally, these areas have been largely separate domains of inquiry.
In recent years, however, there has been a growing interest in how
motivation and personality interface with the physical environment
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2003; Gosling, Ko, Mannarelli, & Morris,
2002; Koole & Van den Berg, 2004). In view of these promising
developments, future theory and research may benefit enormously
from a continued interchange between environmental psychology
and research on personality and motivation processes.
Concluding Remarks
People have longed to live in harmony with nature ever since
human civilization created a rift between homo sapiens and other
life forms. Yet with today’s growing list of environmental prob-
lems, the ideal of striking a perfect balance between civilization
and nature seems ever more difficult to attain. In the present
research, we have proposed that some of the roots of the perennial
conflict between people and nature may lie at the core of the
human psyche, in people’s difficulty in coming to terms with their
own finitude. People may thus need to reconcile themselves with
their own deepest anxieties before they can engage in more posi-
tive exchanges with the natural environment. To live in harmony
with nature, people must first find harmony within themselves.
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Öhman, A., & Mineka, S. (2000). Fears, phobias, and preparedness:
Toward an evolved module of fear and learning. Psychological Review,
108, 483–522.
Orians, G. H. (1980). Habitat selection: General theory and applications to
human behavior. In J. S. Lockard (Ed.), The evolution of human social
behavior (pp. 49–66). New York: Elsevier.
Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1997). Why do we need
what we need? A terror management perspective on the roots of human
social motivation. Psychological Inquiry, 8, 1–20.
Rosnow, R. L., & Rosenthal, R. (1995). “Some things you learn aren’t so”:
Cohen’s paradox, Ach’s paradigm, and the interpretation of the interac-
tion. Psychological Science, 6, 3–9.
Rudzitis, G., & Johansen, H. E. (1991). How important is wilderness?
Results from a United States survey. Environmental Management, 15,
227–233.
Sedikides, C., & Skowronski, J. J. (1997). The symbolic self in evolution-
ary context. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 80–102.
Shacham, S. (1983). A shortened version of the Profile of Mood States.
Journal of Personality Assessment, 47, 305–306.
Shultis, J. (1999). The duality of wilderness: Comparing popular and
political conceptions of wilderness in New Zealand. Society & Natural
Resources, 12, 389–404.
Simon, L., Greenberg, J., & Brehm, J. (1995). Trivialization: The forgotten
mode of dissonance reduction. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 68, 247–260.
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). A terror manage-
ment theory of social behavior: The psychological functions of self-
esteem and cultural worldviews. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in exper-
imental social psychology (Vol. 24, pp. 93–159). San Diego, CA:
Academic Press.
Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2004). The cultural animal:
Twenty years of terror management theory and research. In J. Green-
berg, S. L. Koole, & T. Pyszczynski (Eds.), Handbook of experimental
existential psychology (pp. 13–34). New York: Guilford Press.
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